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University, Maastricht, Netherlands
Recent developments in neuroimaging research support the increased use of naturalistic
stimulus material such as film, avatars, or androids. These stimuli allow for a better
understanding of how the brain processes information in complex situations while
maintaining experimental control. While avatars and androids are well suited to study
human cognition, they should not be equated to human stimuli. For example, the uncanny
valley hypothesis theorizes that artificial agents with high human-likeness may evoke
feelings of eeriness in the human observer. Here we review if, when, and how the
perception of human-like avatars and androids differs from the perception of humans
and consider how this influences their utilization as stimulus material in social and affective
neuroimaging studies. First, we discuss how the appearance of virtual characters affects
perception. When stimuli are morphed across categories from non-human to human,
the most ambiguous stimuli, rather than the most human-like stimuli, show prolonged
classification times and increased eeriness. Human-like to human stimuli show a positive
linear relationship with familiarity. Secondly, we show that expressions of emotions in
human-like avatars can be perceived similarly to human emotions, with corresponding
behavioral, physiological and neuronal activations, with exception of physical dissim-
ilarities. Subsequently, we consider if and when one perceives differences in action
representation by artificial agents versus humans. Motor resonance and predictive coding
models may account for empirical findings, such as an interference effect on action
for observed human-like, natural moving characters. However, the expansion of these
models to explain more complex behavior, such as empathy, still needs to be investigated
in more detail. Finally, we broaden our outlook to social interaction, where virtual reality
stimuli can be utilized to imitate complex social situations.
Keywords: uncanny valley, virtual characters, naturalistic stimuli, virtual reality, fMRI, emotion perception, action
perception, social interaction
Introduction
In the last decade, cognitive neuroscience research and especially studies employing brain imaging
methods like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG)
underwent significant changes in the type of stimulus material used to investigate human cognition.
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Specifically, this was seen in a shift toward using more naturalistic
stimuli, as compared to highly controlled, simplified stimuli. For
example, Bartels and Zeki (2004) and Hasson et al. (2004), as well
as many subsequent investigations, showed new ways to analyze
brain activity arising from complex stimulus material such as
video clips or entire films (Bartels et al., 2008; Hasson et al.,
2008a,b; Nishimoto et al., 2011; Lahnakoski et al., 2012). The
developments have given strong impulse and momentum to the
fields of social and affective neuroscience in particular, as these
fields may profit significantly from the use of naturalistic stimuli.
These stimuli are appealing because they have the benefit of being
multi-modal, temporally coherent and engaging, and allow for
a better understanding of how the brain processes information
in complex everyday situations. Importantly, use of such stimuli
provides a means to experimentally control the events and inter-
actions to which the participant is exposed, which is difficult to
obtain in real social situations (Tikka et al., 2012).
This recent preference for natural stimuli has not been lim-
ited to films, but also extended to the domains of robotics
and computer-generated (CG) imagery, enabling interdisciplinary
groups to branch between these fields of research. For example,
MacDorman and Ishiguro (2006) and Chaminade and Cheng
(2009) argued for using human-like robots (androids) in cogni-
tive and social science investigations because of their advantages
to study human behavior. Similar to films, which can be seen
as controllable simulations of reality, MacDorman and Ishiguro
(2006) pointed out that androids could be utilized to simulate
social situations in a regulated manner. Especially during social
interaction, androids have the advantage of physical presence over
CG human-like characters. However, CG characters may also
be perceived as lifelike, particularly when presented within an
immersive three-dimensional virtual environment. Within this
virtual environment participants may experience a sense of being
there, called “presence” (Slater et al., 2009, 2010). When experi-
encing high presence, participants respond in a realistic manner
to characters and events in the virtual environment (Sanchez-
Vives and Slater, 2005). Therefore, CG characters may be a viable
alternative to androids in neuroimaging research, since limita-
tions in laboratory set-up (e.g., restrictions due to the magnetic
field) rule out the physical presence of androids during fMRI or
MEGmeasurements. Moreover, CG characters are easier to adapt
to experimental requirements, the know-how to construct the
characters is more widespread, and the costs are lower. However,
in those cases in which interaction between the artificial agent
and the participant is not needed, both androids and virtual
characters may be presented through videos or images as a less
technically challenging approach. Altogether, these stimuli are
very well suited to study the brain basis of human cognition in
a controlled but natural manner. One can come closer to under-
standing mental processes taking place during planning, social
interaction, decision-making, emotion perception and other real-
life situations by simulating these activities with virtual stimuli.
However, aside from the many benefits that using virtual char-
acters as stimulus material in neuroscience research may provide,
there may also be pitfalls. On many occasions human-like virtual
characters are not just seen as representations of humans, but
are treated as equivalent to (photo or video material of) humans.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the “uncanny valley” function, shown as a
simplified version of the figure appearing in Mori’s (1970) original
Energy article from the translation by MacDorman and Minato
(MacDorman, 2005).
For example, in some studies the implications of using CG faces
rather than photographs of faces to study human cognitive pro-
cesses such as emotion perception are not discussed explicitly
(a.o. Klasen et al., 2011). This may be problematic, as human-
like charactersmay evoke different behavioral and brain responses
than actual humans (as discussed in work from the same group;
Sarkheil et al., 2013). This notion was first illustrated with the
uncanny valley hypothesis, formulated by robotics professorMori
(1970). He theorized that characters that resemble humans very
strongly, but are not human, cause feelings of eeriness in human
observers. The uncanny valley hypothesis claims that when the
human likeness of a creature increases, the “Shinwakan” (affin-
ity/familiarity) of the creature increases, until a certain point close
to 100% human likeness, where a sharp decrease occurs. This
decrease is even more pronounced when the creature is moving
(see Figure 1). This valley in the rise of familiarity, which can be
described as an uncanny feeling, is called the “uncanny valley.”
More recently, this uncanny feeling has been reported during the
experience of androids and human-like virtual characters. For
example, viewers and actors that were performing alongside the
singing human-like robot Geminoid F have described it as eerie
and creepy (Waugh, 2012). And the human-like virtual characters
in the flopped film production “Final Fantasy: The SpiritsWithin”
were perceived as having “a coldness in the eyes, a mechanical
quality in the movements” (Travers, 2001).
However, the differences that may occur between perceiving an
artificial agent and a human being are not negative per se; they
can also teach us more about the conditions under which we still
perceive a stimulus as human. In this review we aim to investigate
if, when, and how the perception of human-like CG characters
and androids differs from the perception of humans, and what
factors influence this perception. We approach the matter from
a cognitive neuroscience perspective, paying particular attention
to the role of virtual characters as potential stimulus material
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 5762
de Borst and de Gelder Perception of virtual characters
in social and affective neuroimaging studies, and outlining the
differences that the perception of these characters may evoke in
underlying brain activity when compared to human stimuli. This
investigation partly takes the predictions and properties (human
likeness and movement) of the uncanny valley into account, but
we extend the discussion to other theories and factors relevant
in affective and social neuroscience, such as emotion perception
and social interaction. First, we consider how the appearance of
a virtual character influences its perception, in which catego-
rization plays an important role. Subsequently, we discuss how
emotions expressed by avatars and androids are perceived by
human observers. We then briefly touch upon the perception of
action, where we discuss if and when one perceives differences in
action representation by artificial agents versus humans and con-
sider different theories that may explain why one perceives these
differences. Finally, we broaden our outlook and see how these
processes interact with other social factors during interaction.
Human Likeness of Virtual Characters
First, we discuss whether the degree of human likeness of virtual
characters influences the percept and the feelings they evoke in the
observer andwhether this gives rise to differences in brain activity.
In existing research in this field, human likeness is mainly manip-
ulated through morphing from one image to another in several
steps. The human likeness morphing continua generally have one
of two endpoints: realistically rendered human-like CG characters
(high human likeness) or photographs of humans (100% human
likeness). As a starting point a variety of stimuli is used, including
non-humanCG characters, cartoon characters, robots, or human-
like CG characters. The uncanny valley hypothesis predicts that
characters with a high human likeness will give rise to a strong
sensation of eeriness (Figure 1). MacDorman and Ishiguro (2006)
claimed to have found empirical evidence for this hypothesis when
comparing ratings of human likeness, familiarity, and eeriness for
two sets of morphed photographs that ranged from a humanoid
robot to an android to a human. They showed a valley in the famil-
iarity rating for the photographs between the humanoid robot and
the android, which was accompanied by an increase in eeriness.
However, several subsequent studies have suggested that there
might be other mechanisms underlying these results. Cheetham
and Jancke (2013) pointed out that not one continuum, but several
juxtaposed continua were used in MacDorman and Ishiguro’s
study, leading to discontinuities in the human likeness scale. They
suggested that one morph continuum with physically equal steps
between morphs is a more unbiased way of investigating the
relationship between the dimension of human likeness and other
factors. Additionally, Burleigh et al. (2013) discussed two alter-
native hypotheses that may explain MacDorman and Ishiguro’s
results: the atypical feature hypothesis and the category conflict
hypothesis. The atypical feature hypothesis states that one ormore
atypical features of the stimulus, such as holes in the forehead that
might be typical for a robot but not for a human, together with the
level of human likeness account for the perceived eeriness. The
category conflict hypothesis suggests that when human likeness
of the stimulus is comprised of a morph between two categories
(e.g., non-human and human-like) the stimuli in the middle of
this scale are perceived as ambiguous, leading to negative affect
(Burleigh et al., 2013).
In the first of two studies, Burleigh et al. (2013)manipulated the
prototypicality and geometric realism of human-like CG faces in
seven equal steps and the participants rated the human likeness,
eeriness, fear, disgust, and attractiveness of the faces on 7-point
Likert scales. When comparing the subjective human likeness
with the perceived eeriness, a linear relation was found between
the two, with no presence of an uncanny valley. Similar results
were obtained for the relationship between the objective stim-
ulus properties, prototypicality and geometric realism, and the
ratings. In a follow-up experiment, the hypotheses mentioned
before were tested explicitly, by creating two sets of stimuli. One
set manipulated human likeness based on category representation
from animal faces to human-looking avatar faces (prototypical-
ity), while the other set varied human likeness on the basis of skin
color (blue to natural; realism) for avatars with otherwise human
features. An atypical feature (increased eye size) was introduced in
both sets. They found that there was a linear relationship between
eeriness and subjective human likeness for the realism dataset:
when human likeness was high, eeriness was low. The relationship
between eeriness and subjective human likeness for the prototyp-
icality dataset was better explained by a quadratic or cubic model,
as it showed divergent data points that reflected an increased
eeriness around themiddle of the subjective human likeness scale.
These results supported the category conflict hypothesis. How-
ever, the results were not further confirmed by the relationship
between objective human likeness and eeriness. Also, no evidence
was found for the hypothesis that the combination of the atypical
feature with high levels of human likeness increased eeriness.
This categorization conflict has also been investigated in several
other studies. Yamada et al. (2013) suggested that categorization
difficulty of an ambiguous stimulus leads to higher processing
demands and lower processing fluency, which in turn leads to neg-
ative affect. They tested morphs between photographs of human
and stuffed human, or cartoon human faces (Experiment 1),
morphs between photographs of dog and stuffed dog or cartoon
dog faces (Experiment 2), and morphs between photographs of
different sexes or different identities of human faces (Experiment
3) in forced choice classification and evaluation tasks. The results
showed that the most ambiguous images on the realistic ver-
sus stuffed/cartoon scales had an increased processing time and
showed a decrease in likability, both within and across species.
Morphs within one category (sex or identity of human faces)
did not show this decrease in likability. The latter results are
in line with Burleigh et al. (2013), described above, showing a
linear decrease in eeriness with increasing levels of realism (blue
to natural skin color) for human-looking avatar faces. This has
implications for neuroimaging research in face perception, where
within-category morphs are common. These results suggest that
no changes in likability should be expected for those continua
where human likeness is constant.
In addition to considering stimulus classification speed,
Cheetham et al. (2011) also investigated the subjective category
boundary for CG avatar to photographic human morphs and
measured perceptual discrimination between different sets of
these stimuli. They showed that when participants had to classify a
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stimulus as either human or avatar in a forced choice task, a sharp
category boundary was found, showing a stronger categorization
than the physical dissimilarity of the stimuli. For example, when a
stimulus was physically 33% human, it was categorized as human
10% of the time, while when a stimulus was 66% human, it was
categorized as human 90% of the time. Increased classification
response times were found for the most ambiguous stimulus at
the estimated category boundary, which is similar to the results
obtained by Yamada et al. (2013). In the perceptual discrimination
task (see also Cheetham and Jancke, 2013), participants were
asked to judge sets of two faces (avatar–human, human–human,
avatar–avatar), which had an equal distance on the morphing
continuum, as same or different. Participants showed a strong
tendency to judge sets of faces that crossed the subjective cate-
gory boundary as different, while this was significantly less for
within category changes. This phenomenon of perceiving within-
category differences as smaller than between category differences
is typically defined as categorical perception and has been shown
for different types of stimulus continua (Harnard, 1987; Liberman,
1996; de Gelder et al., 1997; Looser andWheatley, 2010). A possi-
ble explanation of this phenomenon in general has been described
in terms of a Bayesian model by Feldman et al. (2009) and is
subsequently incorporated into a model specific to the uncanny
valley (for more details, see Moore, 2012). In a subsequent set of
studies, Cheetham et al. (2014) tested perceptual discrimination
with a different task, which used smaller increments between sets
of morphs, and employed another analysis method (d0 compared
to A0 and % different responses). The task (ABX task; Liberman
et al., 1957) required participants to judge to which of two previ-
ously shown faces a target face corresponded. In the first study,
which tested the pattern of perceptual discrimination perfor-
mance along the dimension of human likeness, discrimination
sensitivity of within-category avatar faces was increased compared
to across-category faces and within-category human faces. The
within-category human faces showed the lowest discrimination
sensitivity. In the second experiment, the morphing direction was
switched compared to Experiment 1 in order to eliminate possible
influences of the morphing algorithm on the perceptual discrim-
ination pattern. In Experiment 2, within-category avatar faces
and across-category faces showed increased levels of perceptual
discrimination compared to within-category human faces. Par-
ticipants also rated familiarity of the images, which—in line with
other studies—increasedwith increasing human likeness. Individ-
ual variability in perceptual discrimination correlated negatively
with familiarity ratings for avatar and ambiguous faces. Finally,
Cheetham et al. (2014) investigated in Experiment 3 whether
their results could be explained by a differential processing bias,
e.g., within-group humans are processed at the exemplar level,
while out-group avatars are processed at the category level. This
seemed not to be the case, as inversion of the stimuli produced
the same results as Experiment 2. Overall, the results indicate that
perceptual discrimination was asymmetrical along the human
likeness dimension (from human-like to human), with lower
discrimination sensitivity for human faces, and that familiarity
increased with human likeness. Cheetham et al. (2014) related
these findings to fluency amplification (Albrecht and Carbon,
2014): higher levels of fluency (enhanced discrimination) went
together with amplified affect (higher feelings of strangeness).
However, as processing fluency is broadly defined as “the easewith
which information is processed,” various tasks may measure and
highlight different aspects of ease of information processing.
Accompanying brain data (Cheetham et al., 2011) suggested
that the brain encodes physical and categorical changes of the
stimulus differently. The results showed thatmid-fusiform regions
responded to physical change, while the medial temporal lobe
(MTL) and a number of subcortical regions were sensitive for
category change. The fusiform face area (FFA) is not only seen as
a region particularly responsive to faces, but as responsive to any
fine grained distinctions between expertise-acquired categories
(Gauthier et al., 2000). Therefore, the activation of fusiform gyrus
to the physical change of the morphed stimuli may be understood
within this context, as discrimination of face-features depends
on experience. Moreover, the physical change in human faces
activated a more extensive network of brain regions than physical
change in avatar faces. The category change from avatar to human
mainly activated the MTL, amygdala and insula, while subcor-
tical regions responded to change from human to avatar. The
authors related the MTL activation for human targets to category
processing and learning, suggesting that different categorization
problems underlie avatar and human target faces. Generally, the
subcortical regions and insula that were activated for category
change may be related to processing the novelty and uncertainty
of across-category stimuli. However, since the insula has been
shown to be involved in a wide variety of tasks (ranging from
disgust to mental imagery to conflict monitoring), more specific
hypotheses should be tested in order to better understand the
role of the insula. Moreover, subsequent neuroimaging research
could also further validate the other fMRI findings of this study,
especially targeting the function of the subcortical regions, such
as the thalamus and putamen, in avatar target perception.
In another study Cheetham et al. (2013) examined eye-tracking
data during the forced choice categorization task described above.
The results confirmed that the most ambiguous stimulus at the
subjective category boundary generated the largest conflict in
decision making as reflected by increased response times. For
ambiguous faces compared to unambiguous avatar faces the
dwell time (i.e., duration of the fixation) on the eyes and mouth
increased. Thus, the relative importance of facial features changed
depending on the category ambiguity. Compared to human faces
this did not reach significance.
McDonnell et al. (2012) took both the human-likeness and
motion parameters of the uncanny valley hypothesis into account
in their study. They created a face-continuum from an abstract
cartoon character to a highly realistic human-like CG character.
These virtual faces were studied as still images as well as mov-
ing images, which were animated using human motion capture.
The characters were judged on different aspects, such as realism,
familiarity, and appeal. The drop in appeal was not found for
the most realistic stimuli, as the uncanny valley hypothesis would
predict, but rather for those on the border between cartoon-like
and realistic. Consistent with some of the previously discussed
studies, McDonnell et al. (2012) suggested that this might be
caused by the fact that the characters in themiddle of the abstract-
to-realism scale may be more difficult to categorize, especially
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 5764
de Borst and de Gelder Perception of virtual characters
with themismatch between appearance andmotion.Movement of
the characters amplified the effects of appeal (higher for appealing
stimuli, lower for non-appealing stimuli), which is in line with the
uncanny valley hypothesis (see Figure 1). Movement is only one
of the properties that can enhance feelings of eeriness when it’s
misaligned with the visual appearance of the stimulus. Mitchell
et al. (2011) created a cross-modal mismatch between human
likeness of a face and the corresponding voice. The incongruent
conditions (human face with synthetic voice or robot face with
human voice) showed increased ratings of eeriness compared to
their congruent counterparts.
Thus, subjective categorization seems to influence processing
and experience of stimuli along the dimension of human likeness,
when these stimuli are morphed across different categories. This
held true for morphing continua from non-human to human-
like as well as human-like to human. Ambiguous stimuli at the
subjective category boundaries gave rise to prolonged classifica-
tion response times. However, in other tasks such as perceptual
discrimination, processing of ambiguous stimuli may instead be
facilitated and differences between avatar and human stimulus
processingwere observed. In some cases, especiallywhen themor-
phing continua ranged from non-human to human-like, the most
ambiguous stimuli increased eeriness ratings. For human-like to
human continua eeriness seemed to decrease linearly. Morphing
of faces between identities or genders with equal human likeness
showed little changes in likability. However, expertise in human
face discrimination among humans may influence processing of
human faces versus avatar faces and modulate underlying brain
regions (e.g., the fusiform gyrus) that respond to the physical
properties of the stimulus. This may have consequences for neu-
roimaging studies that use avatar faces to study face perception
even when comparing avatar conditions directly, as the underly-
ing mechanisms that give rise to enhance or reduced activity to
avatar faces are not fully understood. Given the limited number
of studies on this subject, an expansion of neuroimaging studies
that compare different properties of avatar and human faces and
investigate its underlying brain activity in an experimentally and
statistically well-constructed way is needed in order to further
understand its underlying neuronalmechanisms.Moreover, when
designing multi-modal stimuli, the movement and auditory com-
ponents should match the human likeness (e.g., high human
likeness with natural movement and human voice) in order to
avoid the sensation of eeriness.
Perception of Emotion in Virtual
Characters and Robots
In the previous section we discussed the feelings that arise from
perceiving neutral avatar or human faces with different levels of
human-likeness. However, in the field of affective neuroscience
the emphasis is not so much on whether neutral stimuli evoke
emotions, but rather on how emotional stimuli are perceived.
Therefore, we extend the comparison between avatar and human
stimuli to emotional faces and bodies.
Several behavioral studies compared the perception of affec-
tive human-like avatar faces with the perception of human faces
using either still or moving images. For example, Rizzo et al.
(2012) compared video clips of facial expressions of emotions
by humans or 3D CG avatars. Different types of emotions were
expressed, including the six universal emotions (happy, sad, fear,
anger, disgust, surprise). Participants were asked to indicate which
type of emotion was expressed and how much the clip expressed
each of the emotions. The results indicated that the emotions
were equally convincing for avatar and human faces. However,
the percentage of the clips that were correctly categorized dif-
fered for avatar and human video conditions. These results were
not very consistent, e.g., sometimes avatars were more correctly
identified, while at other times human clips were more correctly
categorized. This seemed to depend strongly on the actor used
to express the emotion. Another study showed that photographs
of human faces and human-like CG avatar faces were recognized
comparably well, but that recognition differences occurred for
specific emotions (Dyck et al., 2008). For example, disgust was
recognized less well, while sadness and fear were recognized better
in avatar faces compared to human faces. Thus, behaviorally,
recognition of emotions seems to rely more strongly on how
(well) the emotions are expressed rather than whether they are
expressed by an avatar or human face. However, beyond the
explicit recognition of emotions, it is interesting to understand
whether emotions expressed by avatars or humans evoke similar
patterns inmotor andbrain responses. First, we review research on
facial expressions of emotionwithin this context and subsequently
discuss bodily emotions.
Motor Responses to Affective Virtual Faces
When observing emotional faces, small responses in the facial
muscles of the viewer take place in those muscles that are used
for the expression of the emotion. For example, viewing happy
human faces is accompaniedwith electromyography (EMG) activ-
ity in the zygomaticus major (ZM), the main muscle for express-
ing a smile, and viewing angry human faces evokes activity in
corrugator supercilii (CS), the muscle for expressing a frown
(Dimberg and Petterson, 2000; Dimberg et al., 2000; Aguado
et al., 2013). It has been shown that perceiving emotional CG
avatar faces results in EMG activity in the same facial muscles as
perceiving photographs of human faces, e.g., the ZM for happy
avatar faces (Weyers et al., 2006; Likowski et al., 2012) and the
CS for sad and angry avatar faces (Likowski et al., 2012). This
implies that viewing emotional avatar faces evokes the same mus-
cle responses—called mimicry—in humans as viewing emotional
human faces. Dynamic avatar faces (morphed from neutral to
an emotion) showed increased EMG activity for happy faces,
compared to neutral faces, but this did not extend to angry faces
in a study byWeyers et al. (2006). For their avatars the CS activity
for dynamic and static angry faces was not significantly differ-
ent from CS activity for neutral faces. In another study Weyers
et al. (2009) showed that these mimicry effects are susceptible
to subconscious priming, suggesting that subconscious motives
influence empathic mimicry. After priming with neutral words
(e.g., street) facial mimicry of emotional avatar faces occurred, but
this effect was reduced (less relaxation of CS for happy faces) when
the participants were primed with competitive words such as rival
or opponent. Likowski et al. (2012) showed that the congruent
facial responses between observer and avatar correlatedwith brain
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activity in a large network of regions, including inferior frontal
gyrus and inferior parietal lobe, regions that have been shown as
part of the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons are neurons
that are active during motor execution, but also respond to action
observation (Gallese et al., 1996). These results further supported
the notion that emotional avatars evoke mimicking behavior in
humans and that this is accompanied by activation of brain
regions that also activate for the expression of these emotions.
In the next paragraph and the section on action perception we
will further discuss their role and relevance to action and emotion
perception in avatars.
Brain Responses to Affective Virtual Faces
and Robots
We can further investigate the effects of human likeness on
emotion perception by looking at accompanying brain activity.
Moser et al. (2007) compared brain activity for the recognition
of emotions in CG avatar faces versus photographs of human
faces. Behaviorally, female participants showed better recognition
of emotions in human faces compared to avatar faces in a forced
choice task, while males showed no differences. When looking
at the brain data for the group as a whole, human and avatar
faces evoked similar activity in the amygdala. These results suggest
that animated faces may be as effective to investigate perception
of emotional facial expressions as human faces. However, these
findings are not entirely consistent with the behavioral results,
where—at least for women—differences were found in emotion
recognition between the two types of stimuli. Therefore, it would
be interesting to repeat the experiment with a larger group of
subjects, to see if the behavioral differences between the sexes also
translate in differential amygdala activation. When comparing
the two conditions (human faces versus avatar faces) directly,
differences were found in the fusiform gyrus. Previous research
has shown that perception of human faces activates the FFAmore
strongly than other faces, such as animal faces (Kanwisher et al.,
1999). The differences in activation found by Moser et al. (2007)
might be caused by the fact that the FFA is driven more strongly
by within-species faces, as humans are most experienced with
classifying human faces. These initial results seem to suggest that
although physical differences are perceived between avatar and
human faces, the expressed emotions may still be processed in a
similar manner.
Opposite effects on the modulation of brain activity in the
fusiform gyrus were found for the comparison of emotional
facial expressions by a mechanical robot versus a human (Cham-
inade et al., 2010). Viewing videos of the robot evoked stronger
responses overall in visual areas V3, V4, V5, and FFA. Perhaps,
because the features of the robot face were so different from the
human or avatar face, more visual processing was required to
recognize the robot face, leading to enhanced activity in these
regions.When looking at the different emotions, emotion-specific
activations were found in the insular cortex for disgust and in
the right putamen for joy. Although the activations were reduced
for the robot emotional expressions, they were not significantly
different from the brain responses to the human faces for these
emotions. The participants did show enhanced brain activity in
orbitofrontal cortex for angry human stimuli compared to angry
robot stimuli (which did not differ from baseline). The reduced
response to the angry robot stimuli may stem from the fact
that the avatar angry faces were rated as significantly less angry
than the human angry faces. Chaminade et al. (2010) interpret
their results for the insula and putamen in the context of motor
resonance, a reaction that has been suggested to rely on mirror
neurons. They propose that for viewing human and avatar emo-
tional faces resonance occurs in the observer, which may then
play a role in understanding the other person. In the decades
since its introduction, the notion of a mirror neuron system at the
basis of motor perception has been expanded to explain complex
behaviors such as imitation, emotion observation, intention, and
empathy (Rizzolatti et al., 2001;Wicker et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al.,
2005). While strong evidence has been found for mirror neurons
in the context of motor observation, as discussed in the next
section, the roles of the regions activated for the experience and
observation of emotions and empathy are less clear. For emo-
tions with basic underlying mechanisms such as pain, mirroring
properties might hold true, but the more complex the emotional
process, the more other mechanisms might come into play. For
example, neuroimaging research since the late 19s has shown
that when we imagine objects, places or voices, similar regions
activate as when we perceive these categories (Cohen et al., 1996;
Mellet et al., 1996; Ishai et al., 2000; O’Craven and Kanwisher,
2000; Trojano et al., 2000; Formisano et al., 2002; de Borst et al.,
2012). In a sense, imagery also makes the regions involved in
perception resonate (Kilner et al., 2007b). As imagery might play
a significant role in processes such as empathy, and there is partial
overlap between regions attributed to the mirror neuron system
and mental imagery networks, it is difficult to attribute the brain
activity to mirror neurons per se.
In conclusion, for faces looking very dissimilar from human
faces, the expressed emotions may evoke reduced responses in
the observers, as expressed by lower intensity ratings and reduced
brain activity. When emotional avatar faces look highly similar
to human faces, they may evoke similar emotional responses as
expressed by mimicking responses in the face and activation of
emotion regulatory regions. However, differences in brain activity
still may occur as a response to the physical differences between
avatar and human stimuli. This may be caused by the experience
people have with viewing and interpreting human faces.
Multi-Sensory Integration of Virtual Bodies
and Voices
When presenting multi-modal affective virtual stimuli, not only
the interaction between human likeness of appearance, move-
ment and voice comes into play, but also the congruency of the
expressed emotional content. For multi-modal affective human
stimuli, de Gelder et al. (1999) have first shown that affective facial
expressions and emotional voice prosody influence each other.
A follow-up study by deGelder andVroomen (2000a) showed that
emotional categorization of facial emotional expressions along
a morph continuum from sad to happy was biased toward the
emotion expressed in the simultaneously presented voice and vice
versa. Similarly, Stienen et al. (2011) have shown that emotional
human body postures and emotional human voices influenced
each other, even when the participants were unaware of the
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bodies. More recent work has shown that the conscious catego-
rization of ambiguous, affective videos of human bodies (Watson
and de Gelder, 2014) and CG human-like bodies (de Gelder
et al., 2014) was also influenced by the emotion of human voices.
Classification of emotions expressed by CG avatar bodies that
were morphed on a continuum from happy to angry, showed
an inverted u-shape for response times when participants judged
emotion visually. The emotionally ambiguous stimuli showed the
largest response times. The categorization curve for emotional
avatars showed an increasing percentage of anger responses with
the gradual shift from happy to angry. For bi-modal stimuli
consisting of a simultaneous CG body and voice expression,
voices influenced the rating of the bodily expression in the mor-
phed continuum (de Gelder et al., 2014), consistent with studies
on human multi-sensory integration between emotional faces
and voices (de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000b; Campanella and
Belin, 2007). These initial results on multi-sensory integration
of affective virtual bodies and voices indicate that the behavioral
effects are similar to those observed with human bodies and
voices.
Emotion Perception in Virtual Reality
Outside of the laboratory, emotion perception often occurs in
more complex situations. Some studies have tried to investi-
gate these situations in social experiments. One such example
is the famous Milgram experiment on obedience to authority
figures, in which participants were instructed to give what they
believe are painful electric shocks to another participant each
time that participant answers wrongly during a task (Milgram,
1963). Even though performing the shocks gave great distress to
the participants, more than half of the participants continued to
do so until a final 450-volt shock. Slater et al. (2006) showed
that during a 3D virtual version of this experiment participants
reacted behaviorally and physiologically as if it were real, even
though they knew it was not. Functional MRI evidence showed
that individual differences in personal distress during the vir-
tual Milgram experiment co-vary with neuronal changes during
perception of the avatar in pain, while no covariance was found
with individual changes in emphatic concern (Cheetham et al.,
2009). Other life-like responses to virtual reality situations were
shown in a bystander study (Slater et al., 2013), in which football
supporters weremore likely to physically intervene in a confronta-
tion when their attacked CG conversation partner was from the
same football club. These results replicate earlier findings from
choreographed human situations and illustrate how virtual stimuli
can be utilized to imitate complex social situations that might be
difficult to orchestrate otherwise.
Evidence so far seems to suggest that expressions of emotions
in virtual characters can be perceived similarly to human emotion,
with corresponding behavioral and physiological activation. In the
brain, evidence for this further accumulates, as emotion-specific
regions show similar activation for human-like artificial agents
and humans, although physical dissimilarities are also visible.
Some typical brain mechanisms, such as multi-sensory integra-
tion, seem to influence emotional avatar perception in a manner
comparable to the perception of emotions in humans. However,
multi-sensory integration is not a phenomenon that occurs only
with the perception of humans, but rather is a more general
mechanism for integration of sensory modalities in the brain.
Action Perception in Virtual Characters and
Robots
As already mentioned previously, the movement of virtual char-
acters also influences the way in which they are perceived. The
interaction between movement and appearance of a human-like
stimulus, in behavioral and neuronal effects, has been interpreted
in the context of several relatable theories, stemming from dif-
ferent fields. We will briefly discuss these theories and review
their empirical support in the current context. The uncanny val-
ley hypothesis, that focusses on behavioral effects, suggests that
adding movement increases the familiarity for stimuli that were
rated as likeable when still, e.g., for characters with extremes of
human likeness on the left and right side of the uncanny valley
(see Figure 1). Movement decreases the familiarity even further
for human-like images that were rated as unlikeable when still.
Comparisons between humanmovement and avatar/robot move-
ment have also been made in the context of motor resonance. In
humans (as well as in the monkey), mirror neurons activate both
to the execution and observation of motor actions. Since these
neurons are seen as a way to predict and infer actions, robots and
virtual characters are quite suitable to study whether our brain
only resonates for observing human actions, since these resemble
our ownmotor system, or whether this also occurs formechanical
and CG actions. Some supporters of this theory would predict
more resonance (e.g., activity in motor regions) for human-like
than artificial action stimuli. In this review, we only briefly touch
upon this subject. For more elaborate reviews on the role of
mirror neurons and resonance in the perception of androids see
Chaminade and Cheng (2009) and Sciutti et al. (2012). Finally, the
predictive coding model (Friston, 2005, 2010; Kilner et al., 2007a)
suggests that the brain tries to optimize processing at all levels of
the cortex, by integrating bottom-up and top-down information
through recurrent, reciprocal interactions. At each level predic-
tions are made of the representation in the level below. Through
these interactions the error between the sensory expression and
its cause is minimized. This framework has been used as a way
to explain motor resonance (Kilner et al., 2007a,b). Also, some
authors have used this model as an explanation for the uncanny
valley interaction of movement and appearance of human-like
characters (Saygin et al., 2011). Althoughpredictive coding iswell-
described for, e.g., action perception and observation, where links
between cause (motor goals) and sensory expression (observed
kinematics) are relatively direct, generalizing this model to more
intricate social phenomena might be more complicated.
Interaction of Motion and Appearance in Virtual
Characters
While the influence of movement on the perception of virtual
characters within the uncanny valley hypothesis was confirmed by
McDonnell et al. (2012), no such effect was found by Thompson
et al. (2011). In their study they manipulated the gait of a human-
like CG character and an abstract mannequin CG character based
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on three kinematic features: articulation, phase, and jerk. The
results showed that ratings of humanness and familiarity increased
monotonically from least natural to most natural for each of the
three kinematic features. An opposite pattern, that is decrease,
was found for ratings of eeriness. No differences were found
between themannequin and the human-like avatar. Thus, changes
in movement parameters did not show an uncanny valley effect.
However, the human likeness parameter was not parametrically
adapted in this study. Therefore, it makes these results difficult
to compare to those of McDonnell et al. (2012). Ideally, both
the human likeness and the kinematic parameters should be
manipulated and compared to get a full understanding of the phe-
nomenon. Piwek et al. (2014) manipulated these two parameters
and found evidence for the uncanny valley in human likeness,
but added motion only increased acceptability of the stimulus,
no matter if it was natural or distorted. Their results are in line
with Thompson et al. (2011), showing improved familiarity or
acceptability when avatars were moving instead of still.
The interaction between appearance and motion can also be
investigated in the opposite direction: not the influence of motion
on the rating of the appearance, but the influence of appearance
on the rating of naturalness of the motion. Chaminade et al.
(2007) showed that the response bias to rate a character as bio-
logical depends on its human likeness, where higher human like-
ness coincides with lower ratings of “biological” for both human
motion capture data and animated data. However, in this study the
degree of human likeness of the virtual characters was not equally
spaced. For example, the monster gave a similar response bias to
“biological” as the human-like jogger.
Motion Perception of Artificial Agents in the Brain
Research on the neuronal basis of motion perception has shown
differences for avatar or robot motion perception versus human
motion perception, as well as congruency effects for combinations
of artificial and biological motion with human likeness of the
character. For example, the perception of human grasping actions
activates the premotor cortex, while the same actions performed
by a robot arm do not (Tai et al., 2004). This is in line with motor
resonance theory and with results from other behavioral studies
(Kilner et al., 2003; Press et al., 2005). These studies showed
that executing an arm movement is interfered by observing a
human performing an incongruent movement, while this congru-
ency effect does not occur (Kilner et al., 2003), or to a smaller
extent (Press et al., 2005) when observing a robot performing an
incongruent movement. This effect has been suggested to origi-
nate from the velocity profile of biological motion (Kilner et al.,
2007c) and interacts with previous experience (Press et al., 2007).
However, when the robot has both a human-like appearance and
moves naturally, this congruency effect for movement can be
found for both robot and human movements (Oztop et al., 2005).
These results suggest that when a robot is human-like, motor
resonance occurs. In line with previously discussed behavioral
findings (Chaminade et al., 2007;McDonnell et al., 2012), an fMRI
study by Saygin et al. (2011) showed that when appearance and
the expected nature of motion do not match, distinct responses
appear in the brain. When investigating repetition suppression
in the brain (the reduction of neuronal responses for repeated
presentation of the stimulus) for passive viewing of videos with
natural human biological motion, videos of robots with artificial
motion or videos of humanoids with artificial motion, the largest
and most wide-spread suppression effects were found for the
incongruent stimulus (i.e., the android with artificial motion),
especially in the anterior intraparietal sulcus. This effect seemed
to be caused by stronger initial activity (unrepeated stimulus)
for the android compared to the robot and human. Saygin et al.
(2011) interpret their results on the basis of the predictive coding
model, as an increased prediction error in the brain when having
to conciliate a human-like character with non-biological motion
properties. However, they do not specify how this interaction
between properties of different senses (human likeness in the
visual domain and naturalness of motion in the motor domain)
would be explained by the predictive coding model. The inte-
gration across senses and the generation of affective states in the
context of the predictive coding model has been discussed more
recently in studies on emotion perception, self-representation and
multi-sensory integration (Seth, 2013; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014;
Ishida et al., 2014; Sel, 2014).
It is fair to conclude that perceived human likeness of a virtual
character or robot varies with the naturalness of motion, where
high human likeness combined with artificial motion shows an
incongruency effect which might be caused by a prediction error
in the brain that can be related to higher levels of eeriness expe-
rience. The prediction error occurs when two properties of the
stimulus do not match and for action perception the prediction
error could occur in the mirror neuron system. This suggests that
it is important to animate human-like virtual characters and pro-
gram robots with human-like motion data. Several EMG studies
by Huis in ‘t Veld et al. (2014a,b) suggested that specific muscle
groups are used for the bodily expressions of emotion in humans.
This information, together with motion capture data could be
used to improve modeling of biological movements for virtual
agents and robots.
Human–Avatar Social Interaction
The human likeness, naturalness of movement and emotions
expressed and evoked by a virtual character or robot are important
factors influencing their perception. These and other social factors
become particularly relevant when avatars and androids interact
with humans. Therefore, in this last section we will go beyond
what has been discussed so far and consider implicit processing of
virtual characters and robots in order to understand more about
social interaction between humans and artificial agents.
In an experiment by McDonnell et al. (2012), participants
were asked to tell if a virtual character was lying or telling the
truth. There were three CG characters, each rendered differently
(cartoon, semi-realistic, highly-realistic) combined with an audio
track. As a control, the audio was presented by itself or together
with a video of the motion capture session (human). The authors
expected that the more unappealing characters would bias the
participants toward thinking that they lie more. No such effects
were found. The lie ratings and the bias toward believing them
were similar for the different renderings and the videos of real
humans. However, participants may have extracted most of their
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information from the audio track that was identical across all
stimuli.
When interacting directly with a virtual character, people often
show behavior that is similar to human interaction. For example,
when offering a gift to a virtual character, participants react much
in the sameway as they would with humans when this gift is either
accepted or rejected (Zucker et al., 2011). When being rejected,
brain activity in the anterior insula increases. As discussed previ-
ously, the insular cortex has been shown to be involved in a wide
variety of tasks, most relating to subjective feelings (Craig, 2009).
When the facial expression (happy/disgust) of the virtual charac-
ter is incongruent with the hand movement (accepting/rejecting),
activity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) rises. This is in line
with another study (Vander Wyck et al., 2009) that showed STS
activation for viewing of incongruent actions by a human actress
(picking up object) based on the emotional context (negative
regard), suggesting its role in perception of social acts. Moreover,
work by Slater, Sanchez-Vives, and others on virtual embodi-
ment showed that interacting with virtual characters in virtual
reality while being embodied in a virtual character gives rise to
specific character-dependent changes in behavior, ranging from
pain perception to implicit racial bias (a.o. Banakou et al., 2013;
Llobera et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013; Martini et al., 2014). These
results indicate that virtual reality stimuli can be utilized to imitate
complex social situations and may also affect behavior.
Lucas et al. (2014) even take human-virtual character interac-
tion to another level by suggesting that in some particular cases
of social interactions virtual characters might be more successful
than real humans. They showed that when disclosing health infor-
mation, participants were more willing to disclose information
to an automated virtual character than to a virtual character
controlled by a human operator. They had less hesitancy to dis-
close information and showed their emotions more openly to the
automated virtual character.
Obviously, these interactions are not the only factors influenc-
ing how humans perceive artificial agents. Robots and avatars
can be programmed to display distinct personalities, and these
personalities influence whether they are liked or not. For example,
Elkins and Derrick (2013) showed that a virtual interviewer is
trusted more when the pitch of the voice is lower during the start
of the interview and if the avatar smiles. However, how a virtual
characters’ personality is perceived depends largely on context and
the personality of the perceiver. When a robot takes on the role of
a healthcare assistant, it should have a different personality than
when it works as a security guard. People preferred to have an
extraverted healthcare robot, showing greater affect,more positive
attitudes and greater trust, compared to an introverted robot (Tay
et al., 2014). For the security guard however, people showed the
opposite preference—it was perceived better, as more trustworthy
and more in control when having the introverted personality. The
preference for one or the other humanoid personality does not
depend only on situation or the task, but also is a function of
the participants’ own personality. Extraverts seemed to prefer an
extraverted humanoid to encourage them during rehabilitation,
while the introverts favored a more nurturing personality (Tapus
et al., 2008). Robot or avatar personalities thus may be taken
into account when designing stimuli for social neuroimaging
experiments. In combination with personality questionnaires for
the participant and other hypothesis-relevant measures, personal-
ity profiling of avatars may be especially advantageous for virtual
reality experiments.
Conclusion
When designing human-like characters to investigate human cog-
nition in neuroimaging research evidence so far indicates that,
contradictory to the predictions of the uncanny valley hypothesis,
the most human-like characters are processed most similarly to
human stimuli on a behavioral and neuronal level. Thus, not the
most realistic looking virtual characters evoke an eerie feeling, but
rather those on the border between non-human and human cat-
egories, especially if they are combined with human-like motion.
This subjective experience seems to arise fromdifficulty in catego-
rizing ambiguous characters that look neither human nor robot-,
avatar- or animal-like, which also leads to increased response
times for categorization.
Since humans are experienced in perceiving human faces, view-
ing avatars may evoke differential processing, e.g., enhanced per-
ceptual discrimination, and modulate underlying brain activity.
This suggests that results from avatar and human data may not
always be comparable and should be interpreted with care. The
underlying mechanisms that give rise to this modulation are not
fully understood and therefore further neuroimaging research that
compares different physical properties of avatars and humans is
needed.
The perception of emotional expressions by human-like char-
acters seems to be fairly similar to perception of human emotions,
with corresponding behavioral and physiological activation. This
is supported by brain data, although again the physical properties
of the stimuli may still cause neuronal differences. For artificial
faces that look very dissimilar from human faces, the expressed
emotions may evoke reduced responses in the observers, as
expressed by lower intensity ratings and reduced brain activity.
Research on the influence of movement on the perceived eeri-
ness of artificial characters shows conflicting results. One study
showed the described uncanny valley effect, with an additive effect
of motion, while other studies found that added motion only
increased the familiarity of the characters. Human-like avatars
thatmove realistically aremore likeable and perceived as similar to
real humans, as shown, e.g., by the behavioralmotion-interference
effect and motor resonance in the brain. Non-realistic avatars or
robots do not show these effects. Eerie feelings for human-like
characters with artificial motion might be explained by the pre-
dictive codingmodel, when the predicted humanmotion patterns
and observed artificial motions lead to an increased prediction
error. However, this still needs to be investigated in more detail
in order to elaborate the model to more complex processes. It
is important in social neuroscience research that, when mov-
ing avatars or robots are used, their motion is modeled with
biologically appropriate parameters and that possible perceptual
differences are taken into account.
When socially interactingwith humanoids peoplemay perceive
and react as if they were interacting with human beings, showing
brain activity in regions relating to emotion and interpersonal
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experience. Virtual reality experiments may play a significant role
in simulating social situations, as these have shown to directly
affect social behavior. Neuroimaging experiments could further
investigate these virtual experiences by measuring the specific
neuronal modulations that lay at the foundation of the behavioral
responses.
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